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(A) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Const. Art. VIII# Sec. 5, and Utah Code Ann. 
78-2A-3 (2)(i). (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUE; In its construction of a decree of divorce, the court 
went beyond clarification resulting in a modification of decree 
without petition and proof of material change in circumstance. 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error Standard. 
Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990) , In Re 
Marriage of Jarvis. 792 P.2d 1259 (Wash. App. 1990). Grover v. 
Grover, 834 P.2d 821 (Utah App. 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES & RULES 
1. Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(3) (1953 as amended). See 
Addendum 2 . 
2. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 201, Judicial Notice of 
Adjudicative Facts. See Addendum 3 . 
3. Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 6-404. See 
Addendum 4 . 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
Appellant challenges an order entered October 14, 1992 by 
the Honorable Pat Brian pursuant to the recommendation of the 
Honorable Commissioner Thomas Arnett made upon appellee's order 
to show cause wherein the decree of divorce was construed to 
provide that defendant pay real property taxes. 
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B. Course of Proceedings 
On August 8, 1989, the court entered the parties findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and decree of divorce. On July 21, 
1992, the court issued an order to show cause which together with 
appellees affidavit were servcid upon appellant on July 23, 1992. 
The order to show cause was continued to September 24, 1992. On 
September 18, 1992, appellant mailed to appellee its response to 
order to show cause and affidavit. On September 24, 1992, the 
Honorable Thomas Arnett heard the parties argument of plaintiff's 
order to show cause. The parties stipulated that but for the 
issue whether defendant was obligated to pay real property taxes 
all other issues were continued. 
3. Disposition at Trial Court 
Commissioner Thomas Arnett construed the decree of divorce 
as providing under the decree that appellant was obligated to pay 
real property taxes. On October 14, 1992, the Honorable Pat 
Brian executed an order requiring appellant "pay all property 
taxes accrued on the marital residence from the date of the 
divorce he no longer had possession of the property". On 
November 13, 1992, defendant filed this appeal. 
4. Statement of Facts 
On April 7, 1989, appellee filed her complaint for divorce. 
(Record, pages 2, 3 & 4). Appellant did not respond to the 
complaint as summoned to. On August 8, 1989, the court after a 
hearing attended by appellee entered findings of fact, 
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conclusions of law and decree. (Record, pages 8-13). The decree 
provisions relative to real property division and debt allocation 
are mirror images of the relief as prayed by appellee in her 
complaint. The decree provides as follows: 
a. "The parties are purchasing the house and lot 
located at 2268 So. 2300 E., possession of which shall be awarded 
to the defendant, with the house to be listed for sale and sold 
as soon as possible. The defendant shall be required to maintain 
the house and yard in a clean and neat condition to facilitate 
the sale. At sale the first mortgage shall be paid in full, 
along with a home improvement loan to owed to Continental Bank. 
The remaining proceeds, if any, shall be paid towards the 
parties' debt to the IRS and Utah State, and if any proceeds 
remain after that debt is paid, the parties shall share them 
equally. The defendant shall be responsible for all monthly 
payments and utilities on the home until it is sold, holding the 
plaintiff harmless therefrom.11 
b. "The plaintiff shall be responsible for one-half of 
the monthly payment on the parties7 bankruptcy and one-half of 
the debt to the State of Utah and the IRS, and any debts in her 
name, holding the defendant harmless therefrom. The defendant 
shall be responsible for one-half of the monthly payment on the 
parties' bankruptcy and one-half of the debt to the State of Utah 
and the IRS, and any debts in his name, holding the plaintiff 
harmless therefrom." 
3 
Appellee filed an order to show cause supported by affidavit 
wherein she requested a judgment against defendant in the amount 
of all past-due property taxes which defendant has failed to pay 
which will be paid by plaintiff as soon as the house is sold. 
(Record, page 16, at paragraph 8 and Record, page 20, at 
paragraph 3) . In response thereto appellant alleged that he was 
not ordered to pay property taxes. The taxes were unpaid prior 
to the decree and were to be paid when the house was sold. 
(Record, page 23, paragraph B and Record, page 27, paragraph 5). 
Upon hearing before the Honorable Commissioner Arnett, the 
parties continued, except for the issue-who is responsible for 
real property taxes-all other issues. (Addendum 1 page 3, 1-
13) . Appellee in her argument informed the court that the 
mortgage payment did not include a payment for property taxes 
(Addendum 1 page 3 at 11-13). The appellee argued that since the 
decree states that appellant should pay the monthly expenses that 
this would include property taxes and plaintiff would owe taxes 
accruing while appellant was in possession. (Addendum 1, page 3, 
22-25 and page 4, lines 1-3). 
Appellant argued because the decree made no provision for 
property taxes, the parties bound themselves to split the tax 
obligation and appellee was asking the court to add phrases and 
interpret a decree by retroactively modifying it to insert a 
provision to say what happened to taxes wherein there is nothing 
in the decree to say what happens. Appellant stated the court 
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shouldn't add phrases into a decree. (Addendum 1, page 6, 1-25 
and page 7, 1-20). 
In its decision ordering appellant pay the real property 
taxes, the court focused its interpretation of the decree upon 
the decree provision that defendant shall be responsible for all 
monthly payments and utilities on the home until it is sold 
holding the plaintiff harmless therefrom. The court took 
judicial notice of the fact that mortgage companies and lending 
institutions routinely treat both taxes and insurance as monthly 
expenses even though due once per year. The court stated 
property taxes are ongoing expenses related to home ownership 
even though payable once per year. The court further stated as 
rationale for its decision that defendant had the benefit of home 
use. The court stated that the decree neither delineated what 
debts each party was to pay nor did the decree refer to property 
taxes. (Addendum 1, page 8, 19-25, page 9, 1-13). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In its application of general rules of construction, the 
court erred because the decree is unambiguous, therefore, 
construction is impermissible. Assuming the decree is ambiguous, 
the intent of the court in entering the decree was to provide 
only that relief as prayed which it did in clear language which 
language can be given full force and effect without construction. 
If the decree debt provisions imply anything they imply an intent 
that all taxes be paid from the proceeds of sale and if not from 
the parties equally. The court's use of judicial notice was 
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improper and prejudicial because the facts taken notice of are 
subject to reasonable dispute. The court in construing the 
decree went beyond a clarification of existing terms resulting in 
an expansion of the decree which is in effect a modification of 
decree without petition and change of circumstance. 
ARGUMENT 
General Rules of Construction applicable to written 
instruments and judgments apply to decrees of divorce. Delancey 
v. Delancey, 714 P. 2d 32 (Idaho 1986). Chavez v. Chavez, 485 
P.2d 735 (N.M. 1971) see, Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57 
(Utah App. 1990) (Court used rules of construction in divorce 
case). Utah Courts also have continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for ...[d]ebts as is reasonable 
and necessary. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-5(3). (1953 as amended). 
The party requesting a modification of decree must file a 
petition to modify the decree and may not proceed by means of an 
order to show cause. Petitioner must demonstrate that there has 
been a material change of circumstances occurring since the 
decree not contemplated in the decree itself. Grover v. Grover, 
839 P.2d 871 (Utah App. 1992). Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 
P.2d 57 (Utah App. 1990). 
In the case at bar, appellant contends that the court 
improperly construed the parties decree resulting in a modified 
decree where appellant is ordered to retroactively pay real 
property taxes. Construction and modification are not the same. 
The former presents a question of law to be determined from 
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examination of the decree itself to determine its intended effect 
which may result in the courts clarification of the decree which 
is merely a definition of the rights which have already been 
given and those rights may be completely spelled out by the 
court. The latter, modification, occurs when a party's rights 
are either extended beyond or reduced from those originally 
intended in the decree. In Re Marriage of Jarvis, 792 P.2d 1259 
(Wash. App. 1990). 
A. Construction: 
Parties are bound by the terms of their divorce decrees. 
Lord v. Shaw, 682 P.2d 853 (Utah 1984). When a divorce decree is 
clear and unambiguous neither pleadings, findings nor matters 
outside the record may be used to change its meaning or construe 
it. Chavez v. Chavez, 485 P.2d 735 (N.M. 1971). "If the 
language used in a judgment is ambiguous there is room for 
construction, but if the language used is plain and unambiguous 
there is no room for construction or interpretation and the 
effect thereof must be declared in light of the literal meaning 
of the language used." 49 C.J.S., Judgments, Sec. 436(A). A 
court is justified in determining that an order is ambiguous if 
its terms are either unclear or missing. Language in a written 
document is ambiguous if the words used may be understood to 
support two or more plausible meanings. Whitehouse v. 
Whitehguse, 790 P.2d 57 (Utah App. 1990). 
The language sought defined by appellee upon examination is 
not ambiguous. The decree at paragraph 5 provides that 
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defendant, appellant, shall be responsible for all monthly 
payments and utilities on the home until sold. The words "All 
monthly payments" are not susceptible of more than one meaning. 
The words plainly and simply describe payments due monthly. 
Appellee seeks another meaning to the words; namely, monthly 
payments mean yearly real property taxes. The mere fact that 
another meaning is sought does not make the words ambiguous. 
Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980). Appellant urges this 
court given there is no ambiguity to construe the language 
literally. 
Assuming the language is ambiguous, the court must construe 
it in light of general rules of construction. "In construing a 
decree, it should be construed together as a whole so as to give 
meaning and force to all its terms, and, if a reasonable 
construction can be had which will give force to all of its 
wording, such a construction should be made." Huble v. Cache Co. 
Drainage Dist. No. 3, 259 P.2d 893 (Utah 1953). "It is proper to 
refer to pleadings in case in order to explain or limit the 
language used in a decree." Salt Lake City v. Telluride Power 
Co. , 17 P.2d 281, (Utah 1932). "The court should look to the 
intent of the court entering the decree as gathered from the 
decree and other evidence. A judgment or decree like any other 
written instrument is to be construed reasonably and as a whole. 
Effect must be given not only to that which is expressed, but 
also to that which is unavoidably and necessarily implied in the 
8 
judgment or decree." Anderson v. Anderson, 585 P.2d 938 (Hawaii 
1978) . 
The decree debt provisions can be read as a whole with full 
meaning, force and effect given to all terms without any resort 
to construction. The decree simply provides as follows: 
appellant pay all monthly house and utility payments; both 
parties pay all debts in their names; the parties each pay 1/2 of 
state & federal taxes; and if possible the state and federal 
taxes are to be paid from real property sale proceeds. It is 
only when one seeks to add something to the decree such as debt 
provisions relative to real property taxes that one needs to 
construe the decree. In reading the pleadings, the complaint is 
the only pleading of substance. The complaint contains no 
reference to real property taxes whatsoever. As a matter of law, 
a court in awarding a default judgment cannot grant relief in 
excess of that relief as prayed. Utah Rules Civil Procedure, 
Rule 54(c)(a). Therefore, it is logical to conclude that the 
court because it could not grant such relief: it did not intend 
to grant the parties real property tax relief. If any 
implication can be drawn from the decree, it is that the court 
intended for all taxes to be paid from the house proceeds, and if 
unpaid, the parties were to each pay 1/2 of all taxes. 
The extrinsic evidence; ie, judicial notice, utilized by the 
court to construe the decree was improper evidence and 
prejudicial. The court took judicial notice of the fact that 
mortgage companies and lending institutions routinely treat both 
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taxes and insurance as monthly payments even though due once per 
year; therefore, monthly payments mean taxes and mortgage 
payments. Such notice is improper because these so called 
adjudicative facts are subject to reasonable dispute. See, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 201. Many mortgages, including the 
parties mortgage at issue, do not have monthly tax escrow 
payments built into the monthly mortgage payment. In looking at 
the courts transcript, it is apparent that the courts 
construction was founded upon its judicial notice; therefore, the 
error was prejudicial to appellant. 
B. Modification; 
A modification occurs when parties rights are either 
extended beyond or reduced from those originally intended in the 
decree. In Re Jarvis, 792 P.2d 1259 (Wash. App. 1990). In this 
case prior to the courts construction, property taxes were not 
mentioned whatsoever in the courts decree. As construed the 
decree now allocates property taxes between the parties. An 
entire new category of debt; ie, property taxes, has been 
inserted into the decree and enforced. The court intended only to 
grant judgment upon the complaint as prayed. Given that property 
taxes were omitted entirely from the complaint, the inclusion 
later of real property taxes goes beyond the pleadings and 
default decree resulting in an extension of the parties rights. 
The court by extending appellees rights without petition, trial 
and proof of a material change of circumstance €*rred. 
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CONCLUSION 
The court should not have construed the parties decree. The 
decree is enforceable as written. Appellee in her divorce 
complaint failed to include a request to allocate real property 
taxes. At the time of the decree, the circumstances presumed the 
real property would be sold in a relative short time. These 
circumstances changed; therefore, appellee sought equitable 
changes to the decree to allocate taxes given these new 
circumstances. The court in construing the default decree 
extended the decree debt allocation to comport with the new 
change of circumstances resulting in a modification. 
Wherefore, appellant prays the courts order be reversed and 
the case be remanded for appellee to file a petition to modify if 
she so chooses. 
DATED this 12th day of May, 1993. 
DAVID J.^ BEtfCEAU 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Forsman vs. Forsman. 
MS. ALLEN: This is our Order to Show Cause 
and we've prepared an exhibit that has been given to Mr. 
Berceau. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. ALLEN: A lot of things have changed 
since the Order to Show Cause was filed. As a result what I 
would like to do is make a motion to continue the order to 
show cause. I think Mr. Berceau agrees with that. However, 
it would be helpful for us in. increasing our chances that we 
might resolve this by ourselves without actually coming back 
to court if we argue one issue. 
What we have is a house that was in the possession 
of the defendant. He was supposed to pay the monthly 
expenses. That's what the decree says on the house and sell 
it. He didn't do so. There was a balloon payment due and 
when it came to the point that that balloon payment was due, 
the plaintiff's parents gave her money to pay off the 
balloon payment so that it wouldn't affect their credit and 
so that then they could take possession of the house and 
sell it since the defendant hadn't done so in a period over 
three years. They now have possession of the house and they 
have a renter there that is hopefully will be in the first 
of October and they have paid payments since they took over 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
the house in May of this year. 
When they took over possession of the house they 
discovered that the property taxes had not been paid since 
the time of the divorce. Three thousand of those were 
accrued during the parties' marriage in 1988. We agree that 
each party would need to pay half of that. The issue we 
can't agree on is whether or not Mr. Forsman should be 
liable for all of the property taxes or whether the parties 
should split them when the decree says that he will be 
responsible for the monthly expenses and utilities thereon. 
It turns out that the property taxes were not taken out of 
the — were not included in the mortgage payment so he 
didn't pay them. 
Our position is that he does owe them, that he was 
in possession of the house, that he was dilatory in selling 
it. He claims to have listed it. No offers were ever made. 
We have no idea what he did. Common sense says he couldn't 
have or else it would have sold. If it wouldn't sell for 
enough to cover the outstanding obligations, that still 
doesn't mean he couldn't present an offer and the parties 
couldn't decide whether to kick in the difference. Instead 
it just sat and sat and sat. So we believe that he was 
dilatory in selling it and that because he had possession of 
it and because the decree says that he should pay the 
monthly expenses that that would include the property tax 
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and he would owe the difference between the $3,011.68 and 
the $10,634 which is the part that was accrued while he 
alone was in possession of the house. 
We have other expenses that we won't know the 
total result until the house is sold. There is an offer on 
the house but you never know if they're going to go through 
or not until they actually do, and what we would hope to do 
is either resolve it between ourselves or come back when the 
house is, in fact, sold so we know what that amount of money 
was and what was covered by the sale on the house and what 
wasn't. We don't really know what our shortfall will be 
just yet so it makes it difficult to figure out exactly what 
the defendant would owe the plaintiff. 
I think it would be also helpful to have some 
guidance from the Commissioner as to — apparently the 
defendant's theory that when her — when plaintiff took over 
the house and paid off the loan then it's her house and it's 
her problem and he doesn't owe anything any more. I see 
this as the same sort of situation as any other co-signing 
like on a car. The decree says the parties are supposed to 
do something and then if the item is foreclosed or the loan 
becomes due or the parents in this case come and take it 
over, I cannot imagine that that means the defendant is now 
off the hook and doesn't owe at least half of the reasonable 
expenses to pay the payments and get it sold and get it 
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cleaned up. 
He was ordered in the decree to keep the house in 
good condition. He has failed to do so and because of all 
of that, there will be further expenses in getting this 
house sold. We think he is responsible for those. It's 
clear that the defendant doesn't think he is and it would 
help to have some guidance on that issue also. 
So if we could have some guidance as to 
interpreting the decree as to the property taxes and whether 
or not he is still liable for expenses on the house even 
though the damages have been mitigated by the other party 
that would also be helpful. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Allen. Mr. 
Berceau. 
MR. BERCEAU: Yes, Your Honor. First as to 
whether or not he can be liable for expenses in the future, 
it is my impression that that's what we are continuing and 
if the court gives guidance I am continuing nothing. I 
mean, there's nothing for me to continue. So I would move 
the court that I believe that there's an agreement that as 
to that issue, that's been continued and we're going to 
determine what the expenses are and wrestle over them later. 
With respect to the home. The divorce decree at 
paragraph 5 provides that defendant shall be required to 
maintain the house and yard in a clean and neat condition. 
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n n n c o 
1 I And then it says that when they sell the home the debts to 
2 the IRS and Utah State can be paid from the proceeds of the 
3 home and they'll share equally in any proceeds if there is 
anything left and defendant shall be responsible for all 
monthly payments and utilities. That's it. This decree is 
silent as to who's going to pay the taxes. There's nothing 
whatsoever in it. In this situation, Your Honor, my client 
would testify that the taxes have never been paid on this 
















The evidence would show that they lost the business. They 
had a bankruptcy and they also lost their home — it was 
foreclosed by WestOne Bank and then sold back to them and as 
part of the sale back there were four mortgagees. And that 
would be her two parents and them. So there were four co-
makers on a note, four tenants in common or joint tenants — 
I haven't seen the deed — who owned this piece of property. 
So we don't have your typical situation where mom and pop 
are guaranteeing the kids' loan. These are not children. 
Those four people never as owners paid the taxes 
on the property. Now I think by the divorce decree the 
plaintiff and defendant bound themselves between them two to 
split the obligation if it's not taken care of when the 
house is sold, but they're asking for this court to add 
24 phrases and interpret a decree by basically retroactively 
modifying it to insert provisions to say what happens to 
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taxes when there is nothing in there to say what happens to 
taxes. What's in the decree, it says that they're going to 
pay the bills equally 50-50. I think the court can 
interpret that to include taxes. The court shouldn't go and 
add phrases into a decree to provide for taxes being paid by 
my client who, by the way, also rented the property out as 
one of the owners while he as there. It's the owners of the 
property who are liable for taxes, not the person who is 
possessing it. The tax issue is they should obviously owe 
it equally together and then deal with the other two co-
makers maybe separately in a lawsuit if they have to as some 
type of partner. But to hold him having to pay for 
something that was never traditionally paid. When the bank 
foreclosed in the first place, they picked up all the taxes 
that they had never paid before. The rest of '87 were never 
paid and for some reason the County only shows '88 to date 
as being the taxes owing. So we disagree with that position 
and urge the court not to interpret the decree by inserting 
terms in there that aren't there or the court would really 
have to go a long way to interpret. 
As to expenses on the home, the note matured in 
May. All four people signed the note. As of that time they 
either sell it beforehand or they get foreclosed again or 
they loose possession and ownership of their home. My 
client quitclaimed a deed after the note matured because her 
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parents came in and paid off the home. That was a sale of 
the home back then. When they paid off that note, they 
became the owners. 
We need to also see the deed and see what's 
happened on that. I don't think the court should try to 
hold him liable for future expenses for something he's not 
on the title to. A matured note has occurred and there's 
been a sale. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Berceau. Ms. 
Allen, anything further? 
MS. ALLEN: Yes, I have a tax ledger showing 
that the property taxes for 1987 were in fact paid and if 
you'll notice the paragraph in the decree says plaintiff is 
responsible for one-half of the monthly payment on the prior 
bankruptcy, half of the debt to the State of Utah and the 
IRS and any debts in her name and that's all. It doesn't 
say that she'll pay half of the property taxes when the 
property was sold. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Allen. Let me 
make my recommendation as follows. I've read the decree and 
I think the crucial language is what both counsel have 
referred me to. The defendant shall be responsible for all 
monthly payments and utilities on the home until it is sold 
holding the plaintiff harmless therefrom. The court can 
take judicial knowledge of the fact that mortgage companies 
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and lending institutions routinely treat both taxes and 
insurance as monthly expenses even though due only once per 
year. It's an ongoing expense related to home ownership 
even though it is payable only once per year. And further 
the defendant had the benefit of the use of the home while 
he occupied it and the use of the rental income when he 
rented it. Finally on the provision concerning debts of the 
decree, it does delineate what the debts are that each party 
is to pay and it does not refer to the property taxes. 
For all of those reasons I believe that the 
defendant should be liable for the property taxes for the 
time that he had possession and the use of the rental 
income. I think that it's speculative for me to make any 
recommendation regarding the extent of the defendant's 
liability for any other expenses associated with the home. 
I will state for the purpose of guidance only that if the 
plaintiff suffers damage as a result of the defendant's 
failure to comply with the decree of divorce, the case law 
19 certainly authorizes the court to make the plaintiff whole, 
So if that will provide you with any guidance, so be it. 
At this time I'll return, Ms. Allen, your two 
documents to you for use in further hearings if necessary 
and I'll ask that you prepare an appropriate order. 
24 I MR. BERCEAU: Can the court give us any dates 
25 — is it from the time of the decree forward? 
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THE COURT: From the time of the decree until 
the defendant no longer had either possession or use of the 
rental income. 
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(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage; 
(i) incurable insanity; or 
(j) when the husband and wife have lived sepa-
rately under a decree of separate maintenance of 
any state for three consecutive years without co-
habitation. 
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection 
(3)(j) does not affect the liability of either party under 
any provision for separate maintenance previously 
granted. 
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the 
grounds of insanity unless: (1) the defendant has 
been adjudged insane by the appropriate authori-
ties of this or another state prior to the com-
mencement of the action; and (ii) the court finds 
by the testimony of competent witnesses that the 
insanity of the defendant is incurable. 
(b) The court shall appoint for the defendant a 
guardian ad litem, who shall protect the interests 
of the defendant. A copy of the summons and 
complaint shall be served on the defendant in 
person or by publication, as provided by the laws 
of this state in other actions for divorce, or upon 
his guardian ad litem, and upon the county attor-
ney for the county where the action is prosecuted. 
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the 
merits of the case and if the defendant resides out 
of this state, take depositions as necessary, at-
tend the proceedings, and make a defense as is 
just to protect the rights of the defendant and the 
interests of the state. 
(d) In all actions the court and judge have ju-
risdiction over the payment of alimony, the dis-
tribution of property, and the custody and main-
tenance of minor children, as the courts and 
judges possess in other actions for divorce. 
(e) The plaintiff or defendant may, if the de-
fendant resides in this state, upon notice, have 
the defendant brought into the court at trial, or 
have an examination of the defendant by two or 
more competent physicians, to determine the 
mental condition of the defendant. For this pur-
pose either party may have leave from the court 
to enter any asylum or institution where the de-
fendant may be confined. The costs of court in 
this action shall be apportioned by the court. 1987 
30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce. 
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from 
his wife for the same causes and in the same manner 
as the wife may obtain a divorce from her husband. 
1953 
30-3-3. Temporary alimony and suit money. 
The court may order either party to pay to the clerk 
a sum of money for the separate support and mainte-
nance of the adverse party and the children, and to 
enable such party to prosecute or defend the action. 
1953 
30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Seal-
ing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and 
signed by the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted 
upon default or otherwise except upon legal evi-
dence taken in the cause. 
(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a 
child or children and the plaintiff has filed an 
action in the judicial district as defined in Sec-
tion 78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be 
administered, a decree of divorce may not be 
granted until both parties have attended a man-
datory course provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and 
have presented a certificate of course completion 
to the court. The court may waive this require-
ment, on its own motion or on the motion of one 
of the parties, if it determines course attendance 
and completion are not necessary, appropriate, 
feasible, or in the best interest of the parties. 
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be 
held before the court or the court commissioner 
as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the 
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner 
in all divorce cases shall make and file findings 
and decree upon the evidence. 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be 
sealed by order of the court upon the motion of either 
party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the 
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned 
parties, the attorneys of record or attorney filing a 
notice of appearance in the action, the Office of Re-
covery Services if a party to the proceedings has ap-
plied for or is receiving public assistance, or the court 
have full access to the entire record. This sealing does 
not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend 
the decree. 1992 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed.
 1 9 9 0 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance 
and health care of parties and children 
— Division of debts — Court to have 
continuing jurisdiction — Custody and 
visitation — Termination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to the chil-
dren, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The 
court shall include the following in every decree of 
divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the 
payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and main-
tenance of appropriate health, hospital, and den-
tal care insurance for the dependent children; 
and 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is re-
sponsible for the payment of joint debts, obli-
gations, or liabilities of the parties con-
tracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors or obligees, regarding 
the court's division of debts, obligations, or 
liabilities and regarding the parties' sepa-
rate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of 
these orders. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining 
child support, an order assigning financial responsi-
bility for all or a portion of child care expenses in-
curred on behalf of the dependent children, necessi-
tated by the employment or training of the custodial 
parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an 
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the 
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by 
the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
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maintenance of the parties, the custody of the chil-
dren and their support, maintenance, health, and 
dental care, or the distribution of the property and 
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents, and other relatives, the court shall 
consider the welfare of the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, 
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab 
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party 
paying alimony is made a party to the action of an-
nulment and his rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of t he court tha t a par ty pay al imony 
to a former spouse t e rmina tes upon es tabl ishment by 
the par ty paying al imony tha t the former spouse is 
residing wi th a person of t he opposite sex. However, if 
it is further established by the person receiving ali-
mony t h a t t h a t relat ionship or association is without 
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) When a petition for modification of child cus-
tody or visitation provisions of a court order is made 
and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay 
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the pre-
vailing party in tha t action, if the court determines 
that the petition was without merit and not asserted 
in good faith. 1991 
30-3-5.1. Provis ion for income withholding in 
child support order. 
Whenever a court en te r s an order for child support, 
it shall include in the order a provision for withhold-
ing income as a m e a n s of collecting child support as 
provided in Tit le 78, Chapter 45d. i»85 
30-3-5.2. Allegations of child abuse or child sex-
ual abuse — Investigation. 
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request 
for modification of a divorce decree, an allegation of 
child abuse or child sexual abuse is made, implicating 
either party, the court shall order that an investiga-
tion be conducted by the Division of Family Services 
within the Department of Human Services in accor-
dance with Title 62A, Chapter 4, Part 5. A final 
award of custody or visitation may not be rendered 
until a report on that investigation is received by the 
court. That investigation shall be conducted by the 
Division of Family Services within 30 days of the 
court's notice and request for an investigation. In re-
viewing this report, the court shall comply with Sec-
tion 78-7-9. 1992 
30-3-5.5. Petition to protect abused child — Ju-
risdiction under this chapter. 
(1)A person who has filed a complaint under this 
chapter may also file a petition with the district court 
for a protective order for the protection of any chil-
dren residing with either party to the action under 
this chapter. The petition and procedures shall be the 
same as for the issuance of protective orders in the 
juvenile court under Sections 78-3a-20.5, 78-3a-20.6, 
78-3a-20.7, 78-3a-20.8, 78-3a-20.9, and 78-3a-20.10. 
The court or the cohabitant may use the protections 
provided in this chapter and Title 78, Chapter 3a, 
Juvenile Courts, and when necessary, those protec-
tions under Title 76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against the 
Person, which provide for criminal prosecution. 
(2) A person who has obtained a protective order 
±*~: ~4.;«„ cVioii nntifv anv other court 
per ta in ing to the same family member named in the 
protective order. 1991 
30-3-6. Repealed . 1985 
30-3-7. When decree b e c o m e s absolute . 
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute: 
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and 
entered by the clerk in the register of actions if 
both the part ies who have a child or children and 
the plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial 
district as defined in Section 78-1-2.1 where the 
pilot program is administered and have com-
pleted at tendance a t the mandatory course pro-
vided in Section 30-3-11.3 except if the court 
waives the requirement , on i ts own motion or on 
the motion of one of the part ies , upon determina-
tion tha t course a t tendance and completion a re 
not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in t he 
best interest of the part ies; 
(b) a t the expiration of a period of t ime the 
court may specifically designate, unless an ap-
peal or other proceedings for review are pending; 
or 
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes 
absolute, for sufficient cause otherwise orders. 
(2) The court, upon application or on i ts own mo-
tion for good cause shown, may waive, al ter , or ex-
tend a designated period of t ime before the decree 
becomes absolute, but not to exceed six months from 
the signing and entry of the decree. 1992 
30-3-8. Remarriage — When unlawful . 
Neither par ty to a divorce proceeding which dis-
solves thei r marr iage by decree may mar ry any per-
son other t han the spouse from whom the divorce was 
granted unti l it becomes absolute. If an appeal is 
taken , the divorce is not absolute unt i l after affir-
mance of the decree. i98S 
30-3-9. Repealed . 1969 
30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separa-
tion or divorce — Custody consider-
ation. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children 
are separated, or their marr iage is declared void or 
dissolved, the court shall make a n order for the future 
care and custody of the minor children as i t considers 
appropriate. In determining custody, the court shall 
consider the best interests of t he child and the past 
conduct and demonstrated moral s tandards of each of 
the part ies. The court may inquire of the children and 
t ake into consideration the children's desires regard-
ing the future custody, bu t the expressed desires a re 
not controlling and the court may determine the chil-
dren's custody otherwise. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, 
among other factors the court finds relevant, which 
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the 
child, including allowing the child frequent and con-
tinuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the 
court finds appropriate. 1988 
30-3-10.1. Joint legal custody defined. 
In this chapter, "joint legal custody": 
(1) means the shar ing of the r ights , privileges, 
duties, and powers of a parent by both parents , 
where specified; 
(2) may include an award of exclusive author-
ity by the court to one parent to m a k e specific 
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Rule 105. Limited admissibility. 
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but 
not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the 
court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct 
the jury accordingly. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This provi- circumstantial evidence. The danger of preju-
sion is the federal rule, verbatim, and is com- dice may also be greater in criminal cases, 
parable to Rule 6, Utah Rules of Evidence where life and liberty may be at stake. Cf. 
(1971). This rule is to be read in conjunction Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 
with Rule 20(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 762-63 (1946). See also Terry v Z.C.M.I., 605 
concerning separate trials and Utah Code An- p
 2d 314 (Utah 1979). The matter is addressed 
notated, Section 77-21-44(a) (1953) [repealed
 to t h e d l s c r e t I On of the trial judge, 
- s e e now § 77-8a-l] concerning severance, Cross-References. - Instructions to jury, 
and with the caveat that a limiting instruction p„ i e 5 1 T J R C P 
may be illusory at best, particularly in a com- « ' * . \ " ^ ,
 nn„ N , jnn_. 
plextnalorminwhichtheevtden^esubstan- „ * £ ? * ££"•. R u l e S 2 0 ( b ) a n d 4 2 ( b )" 
tially consists of inferences, presumptions or ' '-oa-i. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Hill v. Hartog, 658 P.2d 1206 (Utah 
1983); State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 
1985). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 338(4), 
§§ 262, 263. 368, 422 to 428, 507 to 512; Evidence <s=> 148. 
C.J.S. — 23 C J.S. Criminal Law § 972 et 
seq.; 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 186. 
Rule 106. Remainder of or related writings or recorded 
statements. 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a 
party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other 
part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be 
considered contemporaneously with it. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
the federal rule, verbatim. Utah Rules of Evi- ment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this 
dence (1971) was not as specific, but Rule 106 rule to make the language gender-neutral, 
is otherwise in accord with Utah practice. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi-
dence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 73. 
ARTICLE II. 
JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative 
facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determi-
nation by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether re-
quested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a 
Darty and supplied with the necessary information. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an 
>pportunity to be heard as to thp nmn^n+« ~r x 1 • 
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tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request 
may be made after judicial notice has been taken. 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the 
proceeding. 
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall in-
struct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal 
case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept 
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and consolidates the 
law of judicial notice formerly contained in 
Rules 9 through 12, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) and in Utah Code Annotated, § 78-24-1 
[78-25-1] (1953) [superseded by this rule] into 
one broadly defined rule. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated the rule with reference to ju-
dicial notice in Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. 
Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 267, 289 Pac. 116 (1930) 
where the court stated: "In short, a court is 
presumed to know what every man of ordinary 
intelligence must know about such things." 
See also DeFusion Co. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Comm'n, 613 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1980). 
Subdivision (a) "governs only judicial notice 
of adjudicative facts," and does not deal with 
instances in which a court may notice legisla-
tive facts, which is left to the sound discretion 
of trial and appellate courts. Compare Rule 12, 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Since legisla-
tive facts are matters that go to the policy of a 
rule of law as distinct from the true facts that 
are used in the adjudication of a controversy 
they are not appropriate for a rule of evidence 
and best left to the law-making considerations 
by appellate and trial courts. 
Subdivision (b) is in accord with the Little 
Cottonwood Water Co. case, supra, and the 
substance of Rule 9(1) and (2), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971). Utah law presumes that the 
law of another jurisdiction is the same as that 
of the State of Utah and judicial notice has 
been taken from the law of other states and 
foreign countries. Lamberth v. Lamberth, 550 
P.2d 200 (Utah 1976); Maple v. Maple, 566 
P.2d 1229 (Utah 1977). The Utah court has 
taken judicial notice under Rule 9(2), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971) of the rules and regu-
lations of the Tax Commission. Nelson v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 162, 506 P.2d 437 
(1973). The broad language of subdivision (b) is 
identical to Rule 201 of the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence (1974). Judicial notice of foreign law 
is permissible under this rule. Provisions of 
this rule supersede Utah Code Annotated, Sec-
tion 78-25-1 (1953), since the statute is merely 
illustrative of items encompassed within the 
broad framework of this rule. The foreign law 
of some jurisdictions might best be left to proof 
through witnesses if the resort to sources avail-
able in the State of Utah is questionable. 
Subdivision (c) is discretionary, but subdivi-
sion (d) requires the court to take judicial no-
tice if requested by a party and if supplied with 
the necessary information to make a determi-
nation of whether to take judicial notice. Com-
pare Rules 9(2) and 10(3), Utah Rules of Evi-
dence (1971). The committee believes that Rule 
201(d) simplifies the process of taking judicial 
notice of adjudicative facts by making it man-
datory when a party makes a request therefor 
and supplies the court with the necessary in-
formation. 
Subdivision (e) is similar to Rule 10(1), (2) 
and (3), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (g) is in accord with Rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The provision 
that in a criminal case the court shall instruct 
the jury that it may but is not required to ac-
cept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed 
has no counterpart in Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971). Accord, State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 
323, 234 P.2d 600 (1951). See also Amendment 
VI, Constitution of the United States. 
Cross-References. — Court to impart mat-
ters of judicial knowledge to jury, § 78-21-3. 
Jury bound to accept declaration of judicial 
knowledge, § 78-21-3. 
Municipalities, notice of existence and classi-
fication, § 10-2-306. 
Ordinance or private statute, notice of, Rule 
9(i), U.R.C.P. 
Seal of industrial commission, notice of, 
§ 35-1-8. 
Seal of public service commission, notice of, 
§ 54-1-4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Appeals. 
Effect of judicial notice. 
Kinds of facts. 




—Court records and other matters relating to 
courts. 
—Decisions of other courts. 
—Drainage district. 
—Foreign law. 
—History, economics and geography. 










Kule 6-403. Shortening 90-day waiting period in domestic 
matters. 
Intent: 
To establish a procedure for shortening or waiving the 90-day waiting pe-
riod in domestic cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the district courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Proceedings on the merits of a divorce action shall not be heard by the 
district courts unless 90 days have elapsed from the time the complaint was 
filed or unless the Court finds that there is good cause for shortening or 
eliminating the waiting period and enters a formal order to that effect prior to 
the hearing date. 
(2) Application for a hearing less than 90 days from the date the complaint 
was filed shall be made by motion and accompanied by an affidavit setting 
forth the factual matters constituting good cause. The motion and supporting 
affidavit(s) shall be served on the opposing party at least five days prior to the 
scheduled hearing unless the party is in default. 
(3) In the event the Court finds that there is good cause for hearing in less 
than 90 days from the filing of the complaint, the facts constituting such cause 
shall be included in the findings of fact and presented to the Court for signa-
ture. 
Rule 6-404. Modification of divorce decrees. 
Intent: 
To establish procedures for modification of existing divorce decrees. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all district courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be commenced by the filing 
of a petition to modify in the original divorce action. Service of the petition 
and summons upon the opposing party shall be in accordance with the re-
quirements of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. No request for a 
modification of an existing decree shall be raised by way of an order to show 
cause. 
(2) The responding party shall serve the reply within twenty days after 
service of the petition. Either party may file a certificate of readiness for trial. 
Upon filing of the certificate, the matter shall be referred to the domestic 
relations commissioner prior to trial, or in those districts where there is not a 
domestic relations commissioner, placed on the trial calendar. 
(3) No petition for modification shall be placed on a law and motion or order 
to show cause calendar without the consent of the commissioner or the district 
judge. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Modification of support. 
Subject matter jurisdiction. 
Modification of support 
Plaintiff was required to file a petition to 
modify her divorce decree pursuant to this rule 
when she sought to enforce, by order to show 
cause, a provision in the decree that provided 
that future child support would be automati-
cally adjusted to reflect changes in income. 
Such a provision violates § 78-45-7(1), which 
provides that a child support order can only be 
modified based upon a showing of a material 
change in circumstances. Grover v. Grover, 
839 P.2d 871 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Subject matter jurisdiction. 
A district court other than the court issuing 
